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Governance:	Mature	Paradigm	or	Chicken	Soup	
for	European	Public	Management?	
Sørensen	and	Torfing	assert	that	“governance”	has	become	a	highly	
influential	paradigm,	able	to	influence	the	conduct	of	governing	and	thus	contribute	
to	improving	our	economies	and	societies.		In	responding,	we	take	issue	with	this	
pivotal	claim,	arguing	that	governance	is	rather	a	parochial	and	decaying	paradigm,	
which	failed	to	improve	the	way	societies	and	economies	were	governed.			
Sørensen	and	Torfing	rightly	observe	that	governance	is	a	slippery	notion.		As	
a	portmanteau	concept,	it	is	hard	to	object	to.		For	good	or	ill,	the	current	author	
routinely	uses	it:	for	example	in	discussing	the	intrinsically	coercive	nature	of	
governing		(Davies,	2012),	disclosing	“collaborative”	mechanisms	by	which	the	
dispossessions	of	austerity	are	normalised	(Davies	and	Blanco,	2017),	or	de-
exceptionalising	Russia	by	showing	how	the	regime	selectively	networks	with	civil	
society	actors	in	certain	policy	arenas	(Davies,	et	al	2016).		The	issue	at	stake,	then,	is	
“governance”	in	the	narrower	sense	of	the	paradigm	described	by	Sørensen	and	
Torfing.			
Sørensen	and	Torfing	helpfully	capture	the	essence	of	governance	in	this	
paradigmatic	sense.		They	begin	with	its	origins	in	the	demise	of	the	classical	
institutionalist	preoccupation	with	the	governmental	and	state	apparatus.		In	
contrast,	governance	focuses	on	the	analysis	of	“complex	processes”,	through	which	
collective	goals	are	formulated	and	delivered	by	a	wide	range	of	public	and	private	
actors	who	interact	to	“define	problems,	set	goals,	design	solutions	and	implement	
them”.		They	interpret	governance,	so	defined,	as	a	“complex,	decentered,	fluid	and	
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potentially	chaotic	process”.	Sørensen	and	Torfing	further	claim,	importantly,	that	
governance	“expands	the	number	of	relevant	actors,	arenas	and	levels”	constituting	
the	terrain	of	analysis.		
We	see	this	(also	nebulous)	formulation	as	problematic	for	three	reasons,	all	
of	which	involve	strategic	elisions	characteristic	of	the	paradigm.		First,	it	neglects	a	
vast	body	of	historic	and	contemporary	social	theory	about	state,	market	and	civil	
society	relations	that	could	be	employed	to	develop	more	resonant	and	
encompassing	perspectives	on	the	spectrum	of	21st	century	governing	arrangements	
(e.g.	Gramsci,	1971;	Stone,	1989).		Second,	and	relatedly,	the	anchoring	in	doctrines	
that	privilege	social	complexity	make	it	inadequate	as	a	theory	of	governing.		Third,	
and	by	extension,	the	paradigmatic	conception	of	governance	seems	detached	from	
swathes	of	political	reality	that	point	more	towards	obsolescence	than	maturity.		
It	is	striking,	first	of	all,	that	Sørensen	and	Torfing	dismiss	debates	about	
whether	government	is	giving	way	to	governance	as	“unfruitful”.		Yet,	a	recurring	
premise	within	the	paradigm	and	their	own	work	is	that	transformations	are	indeed	
taking	place.	And,	they	appear	to	welcome	them.		Governance	is	credited	with	
disclosing	“new	ways	of	governing,	new	institutional	arenas	and	new	types	of	
actors”.		Elsewhere,	Torfing	and	Sørensen	point	to	a	“notable	surge	in	pluricentric	
types	of	governance	throughout	Western	Europe”	(2014:	332).	They	claim,	
“governance	networks	are	ubiquitous	and	seem	to	be	proliferating	to	an	astonishing	
extent”	(2014:	335),	especially	in	North-Western	Europe.					
	 We	see	this	approach	as	problematic	for	two	reasons.		First,	as	Davies	
(2011a)	argued	in	this	journal,	even	a	cursory	engagement	with	early	to	mid	20th	
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century	literatures	suggests	that	interactive,	collaborative	and	networked	forms	of	
governing	emerged	more	or	less	as	soon	as	civil	society	took	to	the	historical	stage,	
and	throughout	modernity.		Older	literatures	reveal	preoccupations	in	the	age	of	
“government”	uncannily	like	those	of	today’s	governance	theorists	(as	discussed	in	
Davies,	2011a).		There	are	myriad	examples	that	do	not	fit	the	paradigmatic	
caricature	of	the	“Westminster	Model”,	typically	employed	by	governance	theorists	
to	conjure	up	their	“constituent	other”.	If	modern	governing	histories	are	replete	
with	hierarchies,	markets	and	networks,	as	they	surely	are,	the	claim	that	networks	
are	“proliferating”	or	“surging”	requires	something	more	than	repeated	assertion.		
Where	is	this	occurring?		Where	is	it	not?	How	do	we	know?	Who	is	counting?	
Unfortunately,	claims	announcing	deep	quantitative	and	qualitative	changes	are	
recycled	through	paradigmatic	governance	literatures	as	an	article	of	faith.		Opening	
this	issue	to	question	immediately	makes	the	empirical	(and	ideological)	foundations	
of	the	whole	paradigm	look	shaky.		
	 Relatedly,	the	paradigmatic	approach	is	selective	in	the	bodies	of	theory	it	
employs.		As	noted	above,	Sørensen	and	Torfing	claim	that	“governance	research	
expands	the	number	of	relevant	actors,	arenas	and	levels”.		The	constituent	other	in	
this	formulation	is	the	much-maligned	field	of	traditional	public	administration	and	
its	alleged	preoccupation	with	bureaucracy.	Even	on	this	narrow	ground,	it	does	not	
stand	much	scrutiny	(Lynn,	2001).			On	a	broader	intellectual	terrain,	it	falls	down	
entirely.		
For	example,	Antonio	Gramsci	spent	his	lengthy	incarceration	under	
Mussolini	excavating	relations	between	state	and	civil	society	in	the	West,	through	
his	theories	of	hegemony	and	the	integral	state	(Gramsci,	1971).		To	apply	Sørensen	
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and	Torfing’s	criteria,	in	the	Prison	Notebooks	Gramsci	enormously	expanded	“the	
number	of	relevant	actors,	arenas	and	levels”	(notably	his	famous	polemic	against	
Benedetto	Croce),	as	well	as	analysing	“regulatory	frameworks”	through	which	
government	interacts	with	other	actors.	Gramsci	did	this	several	decades	before	the	
“governance”	paradigm	announced	itself.	Moreover,	he	has	been	influential	in	at	
least	one	strand	of	critical	governance	studies	(e.g.	Jessop,	1997;	Davies,	2011b;	
2012).		As	a	one-time	thinker	on	Gramsci,	Torfing	(1998)	himself	contributed	to	this	
strand.			
Our	first	substantive	point,	then,	is	that	in	its	paradigmatic	form,	governance	
relies	on	unsubstantiated	claims	about	social	change,	traduces	traditional	public	
administration	and	conceals	resonant	critical	traditions	that	long	ago	developed	
relational	accounts	of	governing	through	networks	and	could	never	plausibly	be	
accused	of	ignoring	non-state	actors.	It	was	conjured	from	a	Euro-centric,	
particularistic	and	partial	reading	of	social	change,	drawing	a	veil	of	discretion	over	
other	potentially	more	powerful	processes	and	tendencies,	with	much	greater	
geographical	and	historical	reach.		Governance	has	created	a	strong	epistemic	
community	based	on	a	deeply	problematic	body	of	theory.			
Second,	there	is	a	pronounced	bias	in	the	paradigmatic	governance	
literatures	to	make	assertions	about	“complexity”	that	require	further	scrutiny.	In	
Sørensen	and	Torfing’s	paper,	a	good	example	is	the	rendering	of	social	ills	as	
“complex”,	“wicked	and	unruly	problems”.		This	discourse	originates	in	the	attempt	
by	leading	politicians	in	the	1990s	and	2000s	(such	as	Tony	Blair,	Bill	Clinton	and	
Gerhard	Schröder)	to	infuse	social	democratic	practices	with	capitalist	realism	
drawing	on	ideas	from	Giddens’	(1998)	“The	Third	Way”.	To	declare	a	“problem”	
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“wicked	and	unruly”,	in	the	manner	of	“Third	Way”	ideology,	arguably	absolves	
economic	and	political	elites	of	causal	responsibility	and	recapitulates	systemic	
pathologies	as	a-causal	puzzles	to	be	managed	through	social	partnerships	(see	
Fairclough,	2000	for	an	entertainingly	devastating	critique	of	Blairite	language).			
It	is	not	difficult	to	see	how	pre-defining	“problems”	as	“complex”,	“wicked	
and	unruly”	imposes	a	form	of	de-politicized	agenda	control.	Jessop	(2007:	244),	for	
example,	cautioned	that	we	should	appreciate	the	“dialectic	between	the	complexity	
of	the	real	world	and	the	manner	in	which	the	real	world	comes	to	be	interpreted	as	
complex”.		An	adequate	theory	of	governance	would	heed	this	advice	by	adopting	at	
least	some	scepticism	towards	ideologies	of	complexity	spewed	out	by	21st	century	
elites,	which	tend	to	be	absorbed	into	the	governance	paradigm,	as	articles	of	faith.			
The	point	is	not	to	deny	that	many	social	phenomena	are	complex.	It	is	rather	
that	an	appropriate	theory	of	governance	should	problematize	complexity.		Are	
phenomena	necessarily	as	complicated	as	we	are	encouraged	to	believe	(e.g.	Sassen,	
2014)?	Which	political	actors	mobilise	discourses	of	complexity	for	what	reasons.	
Governance	theory	could	also	pay	more	attention	to	the	ways	that	governing	elites	
and	theorists	alike	avow	things	to	be	simple	when	it	suits	them,	amplifying	or	
reducing	complexity	to	exercise	agenda	control.		In	other	words,	an	adequate	
governance	theory	would	problematise	the	relationships	between	complexity	and	
simplicity.	To	employ	Torfing’s	earlier	Gramscian	analysis	(1998:	46),	the	a	priori	
assertion	of	complexity	in	governance	theory	“tends	to	marginalize	and	obscure	the	
role	of	politics	with	regard	to	the	structuring	of	capitalist	social	relations”.		
My	third	point	is	that	as	a	consequence	of	these	elisions,	the	vocabularies	of	
governance	tend	to	obscure	injustices	perpetrated,	in	part,	by	actors	who	
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themselves	employ	paradigmatic	discourses.		For	example,	as	Clarke	and	Butcher	
(2009:	590)	put	it	in	a	study	of	business	school	governance,	governance	discourses	
perpetrate	“an	illusion	of	participation	that	obscures	institutionalized	power	
relationships”.	Alonso	(2001:	284)	saw	that	the	language	of	“networks”	creates	a	
“fog	of	ignorance”	obscuring	bullying	and	domination	by	the	very	managers	
circulating	discourses	of	governance.			
It	is	far	from	unusual	to	see	governance	employed	in	ways	that,	at	times,	
make	the	paradigmatic	discourse	seem	detached	from	reality.	Nowhere	is	the	
paradigm	employed	more	misleadingly	than	in	relation	to	the	political	and	economic	
dispossessions	of	austerity.		Sørensen	and	Torfing	(2014)	call	for	research	to	address	
the	lack	of	comparative	and	cross-national	studies	into	network	governance.		Two	of	
our	recent	studies	try	to	address	this	lacuna	by	looking	at	what	happens	to	governing	
processes	in	cities	afflicted	by	austerity	(e.g.	Davies	and	Blanco,	2017).		They	pose	
fundamental	questions	to	the	governance	paradigm.	While	inclusive	governance	
arrangements	might	conceivably	thrive	in	conditions	of	relative	abundance,	or	when	
a	municipality	takes	an	antagonistic	stance	towards	austerity	and	seeks	to	work	with	
social	movements	(as	in	Barcelona),	delivering	austerity	appears	toxic	to	
“governance”	as	a	mechanism	to	“improve”	the	way	societies	and	economies	are	
governed.			
In	Athens,	for	example,	the	state	attempted	after	the	first	EU	austerity	
memorandum,	to	roll	out	a	wave	of	participatory	governance	reforms	as	a	vehicle	
for	bringing	citizens	into	semi-formal	governing	processes,	including	“deliberation	
committees”	(Chorianopoulos	and	Tselepi,	2017).		For	reasons	linked	to	the	
development	of	the	Greek	state	after	the	restoration	of	democracy	in	1974,	it	had	
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not	been	able	or	willing	to	do	so	before,	despite	encouragement	from	the	EU.		At	the	
same	time,	the	municipality	has	been	coalition	building	with	the	philanthropic	wings	
of	global	corporations	such	as	Bloomberg,	Onassis	and	Rockefeller,	now	influential	
actors	in	governing	the	city.	These	developments	are	iteratively	producing	an	elite-
pluralist	urban	regime	with	a	policy	agenda	closed	to	influence	from	non-privileged	
layers	of	civil	society.		
Meanwhile,	in	attempting	to	cope	with	the	human	crisis	caused	by	austerity	
governance,	activists	have	established	myriad	informal	solidarity	networks	to	help	
people	survive.	Many	refuse	all	engagement	with	the	local	state	and	its	participatory	
apparatus.		For	a	community	activist	commenting	on	this	rejectionist	stance,	
adopted	since	the	July	2015	referendum,	it	“wasn’t	about	the	Euro	or	Grexit.	It	was	
about	austerity.	You	can’t	stand	out	as	the	main	proponent	of	the	‘yes’	vote,	as	the	
mayor	did,	knowing	that	what	we	stand	for	is	negated	by	the	‘yes’	vote”.		For	
another	respondent,	“there’s	this	growing	realization	that	we’re	on	our	own,	under	
no	protective	umbrella	of	any	formal	authority	or	institution.	Not	only	that,	but	that	
we’re	actually	against	them”.			Ironically,	these	organisations	could	not	participate	
even	if	they	wanted	to,	because	the	City	limits	potential	civil	society	partners	to	
formal	legal	entities,	sanitizing	and	simplifying	“governance”	by	keeping	contentious	
politics	out	of	it.	
In	Athens,	despite	the	creation	of	token	deliberation	committees	and	other	
similar	mechanisms,	austerity	appears	to	have	destroyed	much	of	the	social	basis	for	
pluricentric	networks,	rendering	paradigmatic	“governance”	marginal,	if	not	
redundant,	in	that	city.	The	state	apparatus	has	driven	austerity	in	a	hierarchical,	
authoritarian	fashion,	with	the	collusion	of	global,	European,	national	and	local	
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elites.		Austerity	has	caused	grievous	suffering,	destroyed	networks	and	further	
empowered	the	powerful,	notably	agents	of	the	non-profit	industrial	complex	like	
Bloomberg.	Unsurprisingly,	civil	society	actors	operating	at	the	boundaries	of	
resistance	and	assistance	wanted	no	part	in	it.		
Studying	practical	struggles	in	Athens	at	a	time	of	deep	retrenchment	only	
highlighted	the	limited	and	diminishing	potential	for	forging	interactive	or	
collaborative	governance	arrangements	capable	of	blurring	or	resolving	
disagreements	in	society.		Other	case	studies	–	notably	Baltimore,	Dublin,	Leicester	
and	Montreal	–	also	suggested	that	austerity	is	an	important	factor	in	undermining	
the	foundations	of	pluricentric	network	governance	and	of	centralizing	power	in	a	
variety	of	disciplinary	neoliberal	state	apparatuses	(Davies,	2017).			
Hence,	vast	spaces	of	real-world	governing	appear	to	undermine	the	
prospects	for	“governance”	as	a	constructive	dialogic	process.	Of	course,	these	
processes	can	rendered	as	“governance”	in	the	portmanteau	sense	of	the	term	
discussed	earlier,	or	through	the	lens	of	critical	governance	theories	such	as	those	
inspired	by	Gramsci.	The	key	issue	is	that	as	a	paradigmatic	approach,	“governance”	
cannot	recognize	either	the	dramatic	retrenchment	of	pluricentric	and	network	
practices	in	its	European	heartlands,	or	account	theoretically	for	this	retreat.	Nor,	
unlike	Gramscian	theory,	does	the	paradigmatic	approach	possess	vocabularies	and	
conceptual	tools	needed	to	grasp	the	constitution	of	(old	and	new)	
authoritarianism(s).			
One	possible	explanation	for	these	lacunae	lies	in	the	origins	of	the	paradigm	
in	the	years	of	post-Soviet	Western	hubris.		The	paradigm	emerged	at	a	time	when	
eminent	Western	theorists	expected	things	to	pan	out	very	differently.		Preparing	
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the	ground	for	his	“Third	Way”,	Giddens	(1994)	announced	an	age	of	post-scarcity,	in	
which	old	class-based	struggles	for	subsistence	could	be	surmounted	for	open,	
affective	and	trust-based	social	relations	self-organised	through	networks.	With	
dramatic	political	and	economic	reversals	afflicting	millions	in	Europe	alone,	the	
period	since	2008	has	been	a	painful	correction	to	delusions	of	this	nature.	
Governance,	arguably,	remains	trapped	in	a	normative	bubble.	
Techniques	of	paradigm	closure	through	which	governance	insulates	itself	
from	criticisms	like	this,	are	also	evident	in	Sørensen	and	Torfing’s	essay.	They	
acknowledge	three	prominent	modes	of	criticism	levelled	at	governance	scholars:	
that	“governance	is	a	marginal	phenomenon;	that	even	if	it	is	a	significant	
phenomenon,	it	is	by	no	means	new;	and	that	if	it	is	new,	it	has	dangerous	
implications”.		This	is	an	excellent	summary	of	major	lines	of	critique.	It	is	regrettable	
that	Sørensen	and	Torfing	choose	not	to	engage	them	and	instead	dismiss	them	as	
“unfruitful”.		We	suggest	that	governance	theory	could	be	much	improved	if	it	took	
them	seriously.		
All	this	leads	us	to	suggest	a	fourth	mode	of	criticism:	that	as	a	paradigm,	
“governance”	is	increasingly	disconnected	from	the	world	around	it.		While	Sørensen	
and	Torfing	comment	that	early	“harsh”	criticisms	put	governance	on	the	
“defensive”,	the	attainment	of	“orthodoxy”	(Marsh,	2011)	has	allowed	movers	of	the	
paradigm	to	ignore	interlocutors,	while	normalising	a	plethora	of	deeply	problematic	
assumptions.		At	issue	is	not	the	existence	of	paradigms	as	such,	but	the	
impoverishment	of	a	theory	of	governance	that	remains	stuck	with	normative	and	
analytical	baggage	imported	in	the	radically	different	conjuncture	of	the	1990s.				
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History	tells	us	that	paradigms	have	a	life	cycle.	Eventually,	they	fade	or	are	
driven	from	the	historical	stage.		Some	are	more	durable	than	others,	for	a	host	of	
good	and	bad	reasons.		As	Beck	(1992:	46-7)	pointed	out	in	seeking	to	bury	first	
modernity,	paradigms	often	outlive	the	historical	conditions	that	gave	rise	to	them,	
and	survive	only	as	“zombie	categories”.		The	concluding	argument	is	that	even	if	it	
had	been	founded	on	a	sound	theoretical	and	empirical	basis	25	years	ago,	
paradigmatic	governance	theory	is	now	well	past	maturity	and	entering	the	phase	of	
decay.		This	is	to	say	that	although	it	remains	influential,	especially	in	de-politicized	
public	management	discourses,	it	cannot	assist	us	in	understanding	or	changing	the	
world	for	the	better.		
Perhaps	the	most	striking	indicator	of	decay	is	that	key	architects	of	the	
paradigm	cited	by	Sørensen	and	Torfing,	have	either	distanced	themselves	or	
repudiated	it	(e.g.	Rhodes,	2011;	Stoker,	2011;	Grote,	2012).		A	new	paradigm	is	
required	that	is	capable	of	grasping	governance	in	a	phase	of	socioeconomic	and	
political	crisis,	spiraling	inequality,	authoritarian	statism	and	“brutal	simplicities”	
(Sassen,	2014:	4)	that	go	hand-in-hand	with	all	the	complexity.		To	develop	such	a	
theory,	we	would	be	wise	to	draw	on	traditions	of	critical	policy	and	critical	
governance	studies,	to	which	Sørensen	and	Torfing	made	vital	contributions	in	the	
past.				
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